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Abstract
Background: The speed and accuracy of decision-making have a well-known trading relationship: hasty decisions are more
prone to errors while careful, accurate judgments take more time. Despite the pervasiveness of this speed-accuracy trade-
off (SAT) in decision-making, its neural basis is still unknown.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we show that emphasizing the
speed of a perceptual decision at the expense of its accuracy lowers the amount of evidence-related activity in lateral
prefrontal cortex. Moreover, this speed-accuracy difference in lateral prefrontal cortex activity correlates with the speed-
accuracy difference in the decision criterion metric of signal detection theory. We also show that the same instructions
increase baseline activity in a dorso-medial cortical area involved in the internal generation of actions.
Conclusions/Significance: These findings suggest that the SAT is neurally implemented by modulating not only the
amount of externally-derived sensory evidence used to make a decision, but also the internal urge to make a response. We
propose that these processes combine to control the temporal dynamics of the speed-accuracy trade-off in decision-
making.
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Introduction
A fundamental problem faced by any decision maker is finding
a suitable compromise between making quick and yet accurate
decisions. Accurate decisions can be achieved by accumulating as
much information as possible at the expense of the additional time
spent on the decision-making process. The alternative approach is
to make fast decisions, but at the increased risk of making errors.
These two approaches are governed by a well-known trading
relationship between speed and accuracy performance measures,
the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) [1–4]. The SAT is a ubiquitous
property of decision-making agents, found not only in humans, but
also in a wide range of animal behaviors, ranging from odor
discrimination in rats [5], to foraging in honeybees [6] and nest
hunting in ants [7].
Despite the fact that the SAT reveals a pervasive and
fundamental constraint in information processing, its neurobio-
logical underpinnings are not yet understood. Great progress has
been made in our understanding of the neural basis of decision-
making in both monkeys and humans [8–30] but many of these
studies have not specifically addressed the mechanism by which
the SAT is neurally implemented. By contrast, several computa-
tional models of decision-making, particularly random walk and
accumulator models, explicitly incorporate a theoretical frame-
work for SATs [31–34]. While the models differ according to the
specific dynamics of information accrual, they generally share the
common feature that sensory evidence accumulates over time
from some baseline level to a decision threshold. Such models have
been successful in accounting for the behavioral performance in a
wide range of decision-making tasks [32], and have received
considerable support from neurophysiological studies demonstrat-
ing accumulation of neural activity towards a decision threshold
across several brain regions [10–12,16,17,20,22,23,26,28–30,35–
37]. Within this framework, instructions that emphasize speed of a
task are modeled as a lowering of the decision threshold compared
to instructions that emphasize the accuracy of performance
[32,38–41] (Figure 1a). Lowering the decision threshold reduces
the amount of evidence accumulated prior to the decision, thereby
leading to more frequent errors. Alternatively, the SAT may be
modeled by shifting the starting point (baseline) of information
accrual towards a decision boundary while maintaining a fixed
threshold. In some models threshold-shifts are equivalent to
shifting the starting point [42] (Figure 1b). There is currently
little behavioral or neurobiological evidence to support one
implementation of the SAT over another [38,43,44] (e.g., see
Figure 1c). While trial-by-trial variations in RTs may be
explained by differences in rates of neural information accumu-
lation to a fixed threshold [12,43], these results do not necessarily
speak to the neural mechanism by which speed-accuracy
instructions are implemented in the brain [45].
Using fMRI, the present study aimed at identifying the neural
mechanisms by which SAT is implemented in a simple decision-
making task. To do so, we used a modified version of a motion
discrimination task (Figure 2) that has been used extensively in
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[30,46–48]. This task involved detecting and judging the direction
of motion coherence in a dynamic random-dot display while
emphasizing either the speed or accuracy of the decision.
Importantly, unlike previous neurophysiological and psychophys-
ical experiments in which motion coherence appears abruptly and
transiently, in the current study the proportion of dots moving
coherently was gradually increased during the course of a trial.
Thus, relative to a procedure with an abrupt onset of constant
motion coherence, the gradated approach slowed the decision-
making process to the extent that it was temporally resolvable with
fMRI. We also included trials without motion coherence, as these
trials assessed how the speed-accuracy instructions influenced
baseline levels of activity in the same brain regions that responded
to motion coherence information.
Results
Localizer Task
The brain regions probed in the SAT experiment were first
identified using a localizer task designed to isolate areas involved in
all major stages of information processing of the motion direction
discrimination task, from motion perception to decision-making and
motor response. We hypothesized that the SAT instructions should
modulate the activity of a subset of the brain regions along this
information processing pathway. In a blocked-trial design, we
contrasted brain activity obtained while participants made a motion
discrimination response to a dynamic dot display containing 60%
motion coherence with brain activity acquired while subjects
passively viewed a static version of the dot display. We observed
activation in a large network of areas including sensory cortex
(extrastriate cortex, MT
+), fronto-parietal association cortex (sup-
plementary motor area [SMA], pre-supplementary motor area [pre-
SMA], motor and premotor cortex, insula, anterior cingulate cortex
[ACC], lateral frontal/prefrontal cortex, anterior parietal cortex),
andsub-corticalfoci(thalamus,putamen,andcerebellum)(Table1).
The primarymotor cortex(M1) wasfurther distinguished from other
motor cortical areas as the region of precentral gyrus that responded
more to contralateral than ipsilateral manual responses in the event-




The task was designed to make the neural effects of the SAT
temporally resolvable with fMRI by gradually increasing motion
coherence during a trial. This ‘gradated fMRI’ approach has
previously been successful in dissociating other aspects of visual
information processing [49,50]. There were three trial types in the
present experiment (Figure 2). Most trials (42%), hereafter named
‘coherence’ trials, included a 1% motion coherence increase per
second, with the onset of coherence beginning at different times
(0 sec, 4.5 sec or 9 sec from trial onset) during the course of the
trial in order to prevent subjects from predicting the onset of
motion coherence. The other trials were evenly divided (29%
each) between ‘baseline’ trials, in which motion remained random
(0% coherence) throughout the trial, and trials in which motion
coherence rose quickly (2%/s coherence rate) at trial onset. The
baseline trials were included to assess baseline activity in the
Figure 1. An illustration of a simple accumulator model of the
speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). According to this type of model,
task-relevant evidence (e.g. motion coherence) accumulates over time
from a starting point until a threshold for decision is reached (horizontal
grey bars). The vertical stippled lines mark the time, along the x-axis,
when a response would be made. (a) In a flexible threshold account of
the SAT, emphasizing the speed (SPD) of responding lowers the
threshold for decision-making relative to emphasizing accuracy (ACC) of
responding, thus reducing the amount of accumulated evidence (and
time) prior to the response. (b) In a flexible baseline account of the SAT,
emphasizing the speed of responding would increase the baseline level
of activity towards a decision threshold, thereby reducing the amount
of evidence, and hence the time, that is required to reach that
threshold. These two models are not necessarily mutually exclusive. (c)
If the accumulation functions are aligned to the time that the decision is
made, and normalized to onset of the signal, both the flexible threshold
and flexible baseline accounts predict less accumulated signal-based
evidence at the time of the decision when response speed is stressed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g001
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ensure that subjects were attending to motion coherence of the
display from trial onset. At the beginning of separate blocks of
trials, participants were instructed to emphasize either the speed or
accuracy of task performance (see Methods).
Behavioral Results
As expected, there was a tradeoff in performance between
response speed and accuracy. Specifically, while motion detection
was better in the accuracy condition [t(12)=2.65, p,0.05],
reaction times were shorter in the speed condition [t(12)=5.61,
p,0.0005] (Figure 3) [40]. Importantly, subjects adopted a more
liberal decision criterion in the speed than the accuracy condition
(cspeed=2.71, caccuracy=.05; [t(12)=7.83, p,0.0001]) (see Meth-
ods). Thus, decisions were faster and based upon less sensory
evidence in the speed condition than in the accuracy condition.
fMRI Results I. Simulus-locked
Hemodynamic responses were time-locked to the onset of
motion coherence within each trial, and percent signal change was
calculated with reference to the volume acquired at the onset of
motion coherence (i.e., normalization). These stimulus-locked time
courses revealed distinct activation peaks for speed and accuracy
conditions across all ROIs (see Figure 4b for the Right MT
+).
The mean peak latency difference between the speed and accuracy
conditions in MT
+ corresponded well to the mean RT difference
Figure 2. (a) Trial sequence. A cue (SPD or ACC) instructed participants to heed the speed or accuracy of their decisions at the onset of a block of
seven trials. A red-framed display containing randomly moving dots appeared 3 s later. Trial onset was signaled by the frame changing from red to
green. Once a response was made, either within the 19.5 s trial duration or at the end of the trial, the frame returned to red until the next trial. (b)
Trial types. 9Coherence9 trials consisted of a 1%/s rise in motion coherence that began either 0 s, 4.5 s, or 9 s following trial onset. 9Baseline9 trials
contained no motion coherence (0%) throughout the trial. A third trial type included a 2%/s rise in coherence that began at trial onset.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g002
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and 2.97 s +/2 .53 SEM, respectively, r=.71, df=12, p,.01).
However, further interpretation of the stimulus-locked data is
challenging as the amplitude and width of these time courses are
temporally blurred by the variability in response times across trials
and subjects. Hence, in order to isolate the neural processes
underlying the SAT in decision-making, we turned to a response-
locked approach.
fMRI Results II: Response-locked
Coherence trials. According to computational models and
neurophysiological studies [10–12,16,20,22,23,28–36], the activity
in brain regions involved in decision-making should increase from
stimulus coherence onset up to the decision threshold. Moreover,
activity at the time of the decision ought to be higher following
instructions to emphasize accuracy than following instructions to
emphasize response speed, reflecting the greater accumulation of
evidence in the former condition. To identify brain regions
exhibiting a surge in activity from coherence onset up to the time
of the decision, we time-locked the hemodynamic time courses to
the onset of the response and normalized to the onset of the
motion coherence. Given that response time should closely follow
the time of the decision [20,28], activity around the time of the
response should correspond to the decision threshold, whereas
activity following response onset would include response-related
activity. Thus, the hemodynamic activity average of volumes
acquired at and immediately prior to response time was
considered to represent activity near decision time (see Methods).
Of the several ROIs probed, only a few showed significant activity
in both the speed and accuracy conditions, and even fewer showed
differential activity across these two conditions (Figure 5;s e ea l s o
Table S1). Sensory cortex (MT
+) exhibited activity increase prior to
the response under both speed and accuracy instructions
(Figure 4c). Importantly, this activity was indistinguishable between
speed and accuracy conditions at the time of the response. This
finding was replicated even when we only probed the maximally
activated voxel of individually defined ROIs, suggesting that these
results are not due to low sensitivity of the group-averaged ROI
Table 1. Brain Regions Identified with the Localizer Task.
Left Right
Region B.A. x y z voxels x y z voxels
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 218 211 67 945
Precentral Gyrus 6 224 216 63 551 32 217 59 490
Precentral Sulcus 6 229 286 1 2 0 5
S1 and M1 3,4 235 224 55 911 37 224 56 679
Pre-SMA 6 22 5 52 259 4 7 56 670
SMA 6 22 25 55 592 3 245 6 5 8 3
Anterior Cingulate 24 23 0 38 714 4 0 38 700
Anterior Cingulate 32 22 1 53 66 7 8 31 53 66 9 4
Anterior IPS 40 43 246 54 107
DIPSA 40 243 230 51 546 47 233 51 812
dPM 6 228 294 9 8 9 0 2 9 294 7 1 4 7 2
Postcentral Gyrus 1,2,3 253 217 42 1892 50 220 42 1327
1,2,3 254 218 24 2343 52 218 24 1656
vIPL 2,40 239 232 41 738 37 230 42 1872
vPM 6,9 251 21 39 68 50 5 39 119
pLPFC 9,44,45 255 8 22 312 53 11 26 442
TPJ 40 252 227 24 999 53 232 26 1998
Thalamus 211 214 10 1505 12 217 11 2269
Insula 13 241 22 5 2876 40 1 6 3040
Putamen 22 1 723 5 8 7 1 9 743 6 1 7
Extrastriate 17,18,19 221 288 1 1333 24 288 3 3322
Superior Colliculus 0 227 2 343
Anterior Insula 13 240 10 1 2139 37 15 2 2952
MT+ 19,21,37 232 264 277 1 5 4 3 264 1 3327
Anterior IFG 46 234 30 0 132
Anterior Cerebellum 28 258 281 7 6 1 5258 282 2 4 2
Posterior Cerebellum 221 257 219 2366 17 257 219 1651
Notes:
x,y,z co-ordinates according to the Talairach and Tournoux atlas [93].
B.A. Brodmann Area; M1=Primary motor cortex; Pre-SMA=Pre- Supplementary Motor Area; SMA=Supplementary Motor Area; IPS=Intraparietal sulcus; DIPSA=dorsal
IPS anterior; vIPL=ventral inferior parietal lobe; IFJ=Inferior frontal junction; pLPFC=posterior lateral prefrontal cortex; TPJ=temporo-parietal junction; IFG=Inferior
frontal gyrus; dPM=dorsal premotor cortex; vPM=ventral premotor cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.t001
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MT
+ is not differentially affected by the SAT.
In contrast to sensory cortex, the primary motor cortex failed to
demonstrate any increase in activity under speed or accuracy
conditions (Figure 6b). Instead, activity was restricted to post-
response volumes. These results suggest that the primary motor
cortex is not directly involved in the decision-making process, and
that its role in the current task is purely motoric. Little or no
increase in activity was also observed in several other brain
regions, including the anterior cingulate cortex (see Table S1).
Unlike sensory (MT
+) and primary motor cortex (M1), the
activity of neural regions in medial frontal and lateral prefrontal
cortex increased prior to the response under both speed and
accuracy instructions. Moreover, some of these regions were also
differentially sensitive to speed-accuracy instructions. Specifically,
the activity build-up in a region of the posterior lateral prefrontal
cortex (pLPFC) extending into anterior premotor cortex
(Figure 7b, left), and in the pre-SMA bilaterally (Figure 7b,
right), was greater in the accuracy condition than in the speed
condition (ps,.05). These results are not only consistent with
accumulator models of decision-making [32,39,40,51], but also
with neurophysiological evidence that accumulation of activity
occurs in ‘central’ stages rather than in early sensory or late motor
stages of information processing [16,20,26,30,52].
Baseline trials. Emphasizing the speed of the decision may
also increase baseline activity (see Figure 1b). We investigated
this possibility by measuring the effect of speed-accuracy
instructions on brain activity in the ‘baseline’ (0% motion
coherence) trials. The primary motor cortex did not demonstrate
any ramping of activity in these trials (Figure 6c). By contrast, the
activity of sensory cortex (MT
+) increased during the baseline trials
(Figure 4d), with a non-significant trend for a greater build-up in
the speed than the accuracy conditions (p=0.09). More
importantly, right pLPFC and pre-SMA not only showed
Figure 4. fMRI results for MT+. (a) SPM of right MT+ (white arrow) in localizer experiment. (b) Speed and accuracy time courses for the coherence
trials, time-locked and normalized to the onset of stimulus coherence. (c) Speed and accuracy time courses for the coherence trials, time-locked to the
onset of the response (R) and normalized to the onset of stimulus coherence. (d) Speed and accuracy time courses for the baseline trials, time-locked
and normalized to the onset of the trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g004
Figure 3. Sensitivity to detect coherent motion (d’) versus
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also greater activity under speed than under accuracy conditions
[right pLPFC: t(12)=2.27 , p,0.05; pre-SMA: t(12)=2.92,
p,0.05], an activity pattern that is opposite to that obtained
during coherence trials in these two brain regions.
These results indicate that speed-accuracy instructions modulate
baseline activity in a specific subset of brain regions (see also
Table S2). Furthermore, the results generally mirror those
observed in the coherence trials: M1 does not exhibit pre-response
build-up of activity, MT
+ is relatively insensitive to speed-accuracy
instructions, and the frontal regions (pLPFC and pre-SMA) are
highly sensitive to speed-accuracy instructions, albeit in diamet-
rically opposite ways during coherence and baseline trials.
Flexible Threshold vs. Flexible Baseline Accounts of the
SAT
The inverse effects of speed and accuracy instructions on
coherence and baseline trial activity in pLPFC and pre-SMA are
compatible with a flexible baseline account of the SAT. According
to this account, the amount of evidence-related activity that needs
to be accumulated to a decision threshold is determined by its
starting point (see Figure 1b): the higher the starting point
(baseline activity), the less evidence needs to be accumulated to
reach a fixed decision threshold. This account predicts that the
activity difference between speed and accuracy in the baseline
trials should be matched by an equal but inverse activity difference
between accuracy and speed in the coherence trials. To test this
prediction, we assessed whether the sum of the baseline-related
and coherence-related activity would be equivalent in speed and
accuracy conditions (see Methods). The results of this ‘‘coher-
ence+baseline’’ analysis effectively revealed that activity levels
around the time of the response are not different between speed
and accuracy conditions (ps..40) in both pLPFC and pre-SMA
(Figure 8a). Importantly, this result should not only hold for
group-averaged data, but for individual subject’s data as well.
Specifically, an individual who demonstrates a large speed-
accuracy difference in baseline activity should exhibit an equally
Figure 5. Activation differences between accuracy and speed conditions at response time (i.e., the average of the pre-response and
response volumes) for sensory, motor, and premotor ROIS (see Table 1 for complete ROI list). (a) 9 Coherence 9 and (b) 9 Baseline 9
conditions. Error bars reflect the SEM of the difference. *: p,0.05. Although the right ventral inferior parietal lobe (vIPL) and postcentral gyrus ROIs in
(a) and the right anterior insular ROI in (b) showed significant activation differences (accuracy vs. speed), these brain regions did not demonstrate
significant activity increase above baseline in both accuracy and speed conditions (see Tables S1 and S2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g005
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order to arrive to a fixed threshold). A significant correlation was
observed in pre-SMA [r=.605, df=12, p,0.05] (Figure 8b), but
not in pLPFC [r=.056, df=12, p.0.85]. These results strongly
suggest that speed-accuracy instructions modulate baseline activity
in pre-SMA, thereby modifying the amount of evidence that must
be accrued prior to reaching a decision threshold.
In contrast to the pre-SMA, the correlational analysis of pLPFC
activity was not consistent with a flexible baseline model of the
SAT. To determine whether pLPFC function may instead be
more consistent with a decision threshold account of the SAT, we
examined whether its activity tracks a behavioral measure of
decision performance, the decision criterion (c) of signal detection
theory (see Methods). As noted above, this criterion metric varied
with speed-accuracy instructions. Specifically, we measured the
correlation between the accuracy-speed differences in c with the
accuracy-speed differences in hemodynamic activity during the
coherence trials. Remarkably, this correlation was significant in
pLPFC [r=.645, df=12, p,0.05], but not in pre-SMA [r=2.039,
df=12, p,0.90] (Figure 8c) or in any other ROI (p’s.0.16).
These results suggest that the pLPFC activity at the time of the
response reflects differences in individual subjects’ decision
criterion due to speed-accuracy instructions. Put another way,
how much an individual subject’s decision criterion is modified by
speed-accuracy instructions dictate how much coherence-related
activity is accumulated in pLPFC (but not in preSMA).
Additional evidence that the pLPFC and preSMA make
different contributions to decision-making come from the analysis
of false alarm trials (i.e., trials in which subjects made an early
response when there was 0% motion coherence at the time of that
response). Brain regions that accumulate information ought to
have greater activity in the growing presence of signal (hits) than in
the absence of signal (false alarms). Correspondingly, in pLPFC,
the activation for hits was greater than it was for false alarms
[t(11)=3.17, p,0.01] (Figure S1a). In stark contrast, hits and
false alarms activated the pre-SMA comparably (p.0.25; Figure
S1b), suggesting that false alarms may primarily arise from
changes in internal (baseline) levels of activity rather than by
fluctuations in sensory evidence (see Discussion).
Discussion
The principal finding of the present study is that the SAT in
decision-making may be neurally implemented by more than one
mechanism. Although several computational models posit that
the SAT arises from changes in the decision boundary
[38,41,42,44,45,53,54], a mathematically equivalent outcome can
be obtained from a baseline-shift [42] (see Figure 1). As elaborated
below, our results suggest that both processes may account for the
SAT. Specifically, the speed-accuracy trade-off may arise from both
threshold- and baseline-shifts, implemented by distinct areas of the
prefrontal cortex (pLPFC) and medial frontal cortex (pre-SMA).
Importantly, these effects were not observed in either sensory (MT
+)
or primary motor cortex, further suggesting that the SAT in
decision-making is a property of a central, prefrontal network rather
thanarising from modulationsatearlysensoryorlatemotor stagesof
processing [16,17,20,26,30,52].
Sensory and Motor Cortex
Although MT
+ showed coherence-related ramping of activity
prior to the response, such activity build-up was similar under both
speed and accuracy conditions, suggesting that this sensory cortical
area is not differentially sensitive to these instructional sets. Since
motion coherence was about 2.8% higher at response in the
accuracy than in the speed condition, one might have expected
slightly higher activity in MT
+ in the former condition. However,
given that the hemodynamic response of this brain region is
weakly modulated by low levels of coherent motion [55], it is not
surprising that MT
+ was relatively insensitive to the small
difference in motion coherence between speed and accuracy
conditions in the present experiment. In addition to being driven
Figure 6. fMRI results for right primary motor cortex (M1). (a)
Isolation of M1 (left) with the left-right manual response contrast of the
event-related experiment. White arrow indicates Right M1. (b) Speed
and accuracy time courses for the coherence trials, time-locked to the
onset of the response (R) and normalized to the onset of stimulus
coherence. (c) Speed and accuracy time courses for the baseline trials,
time-locked and normalized to the onset of the trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g006
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+ is also sensitive to top-
down modulation [56] as evidenced by the build-up of activity in
the baseline trials, though this buildup was generally impervious to
SAT instructions. The insensitivity of MT
+ to the speed-accuracy
manipulation, particularly during the coherence trials, strongly
implies that this brain region does not encode the observer’s
decision, consistent with neurophysiological studies indicating that
MT
+ neurons supply sensory evidence to other brain regions that
accumulate the evidence towards a decision threshold [20,43]. In
this context, the role of visual cortex may primarily consist in
representing the sensory information for accurate stimulus
identification [8], with the accumulation of such information
taking place in central, decision-making areas of the brain [30].
In contrast to sensory cortex, the primary motor cortex (M1)
showed no evidence of build-up of activity prior to the response in
either the coherence or baseline trials, suggesting that it is not part
of the decision-making network [26,52]. Rather, M1 likely
occupies a stage of information processing downstream from
decision-making, most likely corresponding to response execution.
Like M1, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was only activated
after the response. Unlike M1 however, an extensive literature
suggests that the post-decisional activity in ACC is probably
associated with performance monitoring and/or adjustment [57–
59], rather than response execution per se. Taken together, these
results suggest that the neural manifestations of the SAT are not
widespread throughout the brain, sparing sensory, motor and
Figure 7. fMRI results for pLPFC (left column) and the average of left and right pre-SMA (right column): (a) Location of right pLPFC
(white arrow) and pre-SMA (white arrow) in the localizer task. The anterior and posterior horizontal bars in the pre-SMA figure indicate the
coronal planes of the anterior and posterior commissures. (b) Speed and accuracy time courses for the coherence trials, time-locked to the onset of
the response (R) and normalized to the onset of stimulus coherence. (c) Speed and accuracy time courses for the baseline trials, time-locked and
normalized to the onset of the trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g007
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implemented in a specific subset of premotor and prefrontal areas.
Modulation of frontal/prefrontal activity by the SAT
Speed-accuracy instructions differentially modulated activity in
two regions of frontal/prefrontal cortex (pLPFC and pre-SMA), a
finding consistent with the notion that the frontal lobe is critical for
cognitive control, decision-making, and response selection
[13,15,17,28,38,57,60–71]. These results do not rule out the
possibility that additional brain regions, which showed non-
significant trends in the present experiment (e.g. parietal ROIs,
Tables S1 and S2), may be critically involved in the SAT of
decision-making under different task contexts (e.g. oculo-motor
tasks [15,72]). Nevertheless, the key findings of the present study
should reveal general insights into the neural mechanisms of SAT
that extend beyond the specific sensori-motor task used in the
present experiment given that these lateral and dorsal premotor
regions are neither strictly sensory nor motor [64,73].
Speed-accuracy instructions generally affected activity within
the pLPFC and pre-SMA in a similar manner. There was greater
pre-response activity with the accuracy condition than there was
with the speed condition when the motion coherence signal was
Figure 8. fMRI results for right pLPFC (left column) and average pre-SMA (right column). (a) Speed and accuracy time courses for the
coherence+baseline trials, time-locked to the onset of the response, and normalized to the % signal change in the baseline trials. (b) Linear regression
plots between the accuracy-speed differences in activity in the coherence and baseline trials. (c) Linear regression plots between the accuracy-speed
difference in the decision criterion (c) and the accuracy-speed difference in activity for the coherence trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.g008
Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff
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the signal was absent (baseline trials): activity was greater in the
speed than in the accuracy condition in both brain regions.
However, further analyses revealed that speed-accuracy instruc-
tions differentially affected neural processing in pLPFC and pre-
SMA.
The pre-SMA demonstrated a gradual ramping of baseline
activity prior to the response. Importantly, this increase in activity,
which occurred throughout the duration of baseline trials, was not
present in the primary motor cortex, suggesting that it does not
reflect a late form of motor preparation. On the other hand, this
activity build-up was not unique to the pre-SMA, as it was present
in several other brain regions, including MT
+ and pLPFC. Unlike
these other areas, however, in pre-SMA the activity difference
between accuracy and speed conditions during baseline trials was
inversely correlated with the activity difference between accuracy
and speed conditions on coherence trials (Figure 8b). These
results are highly consistent with a baseline account of the SAT
(Figure 1) in which speed-accuracy instructions affect the point
where evidence begins to accumulate to a fixed threshold: the
higher the starting point (i.e., greater baseline activity), the less
evidence is necessary (lower coherence-related activity) to reach
the decision threshold. Consistent with a flexible baseline account
of pre-SMA activity, the medial frontal cortex has been shown to
exhibit anticipatory/preparatory activity ahead of motor responses
[74–76], with such increases in baseline activity concomitant with
decreases in reaction times [77,78]. Interestingly, anticipatory
processes might also account for the general ramping of activity we
observed throughout the duration of baseline trials (see
Figures 4d and 7c), as the probability that subjects will need
to make a response (given that they have yet to execute one; i.e.
the hazard rate [77]) increases during the course of a trial.
Together, these neuroimaging and neurophysiologial findings
converge with behavioral work suggesting that manipulating the
urgency to respond by differentially emphasizing the speed or
accuracy of a response is behaviorally tantamount to changing the
likelihood of making a response [38]. This account is also
compatible with the finding that hits and false alarms similarly
activate the pre-SMA, as false alarms may have arisen from an
excessive urgency to respond despite scant physical evidence for
motion coherence (see Figure S1b).
In contrast to the pre-SMA, there was no correlation between
baseline- and coherence-related activity in pLPFC. However, the
pLPFC activation difference between speed and accuracy
conditions during coherence trials did correlate with the difference
between speed and accuracy in the decision criterion, c.
Emphasizing the speed of responding decreases the decision
criterion, thereby limiting the accrual of evidence before a
response is made. Thus, the activity pattern in pLPFC is more
consistent with a flexible-threshold than a flexible-baseline account
of the SAT. Activity in pLPFC may therefore reflect the
accumulation of coherence-related evidence – i.e. the integral of
motion coherence signal over time - towards a decision criterion,
as has been observed in single-cell studies [12,16,20,30]. This
hypothesis is further supported by the analysis of false alarms, as
there was less activation in pLPFC when a decision was
erroneously reached on trials without motion coherence than
when a decision was correctly reached with motion coherence (see
Figure S1a). This conclusion meshes nicely with the neurophys-
iology literature suggesting that the lateral prefrontal cortex plays a
role in converting continuous accumulation of sensory evidence
into a discrete decision code [17].
Alternative accounts of pLPFC activity are not supported by the
data. The pLPFC activity is unlikely to encode absolute motion
coherence levels, as the difference in coherence activity between
the accuracy and speed conditions was not even discernable in the
brain region (i.e., MT
+) most sensitive to the type of motion
coherence display used in the present experiment. Furthermore,
‘preparatory activity’ [78–80], general arousal, or time-on-task
(trial duration) effects cannot easily account for the coherence-
related activity in pLPFC given that they would not predict
opposite patterns of activation for speed and accuracy conditions
during coherence and baseline trials, and given that the pLPFC
pattern of activity was not widespread across the brain.
Nevertheless, that this area did show increased activity in baseline
trials suggests that it is also susceptible to top-down input,
consistent with single-cell work demonstrating the influence of
both bottom-up (evidence-related) and top-down (anticipatory)
factors in decision-making activity in the parietal and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex of macaques [17,30]. However, because the
accuracy-speed activity difference on baseline trials does not
correlate with the accuracy-speed difference on coherence trials,
we conclude that the SAT is primarily implemented in this brain
region by a modulation of evidence-related activity rather than by
changes in top-down activation.
Many computational models of decision-making implement
the SAT as a change in the boundary separation between the
starting (baseline) and end (threshold) points of accumulation of
evidence [32,39,40,51,81]. Even though most models presume
that it is the threshold that is modulated by speed-accuracy
instructions, computationally similar results may be obtained
with baseline shifts in detection tasks e.g., [42]. A central goal of
the present study was to determine which, if any, of these two
mechanisms is implemented in the brain. Our results suggest that
both may underlie the SAT, with a baseline shift in pre-SMA
and a decision threshold shift in pLPFC. Importantly, these two
mechanisms are not incongruous with one another: a differential
emphasis on the speed and accuracy of deciding may be neurally
implemented in different manners in distinct brain regions if
these brain regions provide unique contributions to the decision-
making process. Indeed, our results are highly consistent with the
notion that lateral and medial premotor/prefrontal cortices play
unique roles in decision-making [82–85]. According to this
proposal, the lateral premotor cortex is preferentially involved in
externally (sensory) guided selection of movement, whereas the
medial premotor cortex is primarily recruited for internally
guided selection and preparation of movement. Consistent with
this idea, several neuroimaging studies point to the pre-SMA as a
brain region involved in internally-generated initiation and
selection of movement [75,86,87], while others have observed
lateral prefrontal and premotor activity during externally-guided
selection of responses [15,62,73,88–90]. Indeed, the different
sensitivities of lateral and medial frontal cortex to external and
internal cues for movement selection offer a framework that can
account for the distinct pLPFC and pre-SMA responses observed
in the SAT. Within this framework, speed-accuracy instructions
have at least two effects: a modulation of the internal urge to
make a response, brought about by changes in baseline activity
in medial frontal cortex (pre-SMA), and a modulation of the
amount of sensory evidence required to reach a decision, brought
about by changes in pLPFC activity. The advantage of this dual
process account is that it may ensure that perceptual decision-
making is jointly based on information about the environment
and the internal state of the decision maker. Indeed, it likely is a
combination of externally and internally guided factors, and the
interaction between brain regions processing these factors, that
ultimately determines if, and especially when, we reach a
decision.
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Localizer Task
Subjects. Twenty-one subjects (ages 20–31, 7 females)
participated in the study for pay after signing an informed
consent document. The Vanderbilt University Institutional
Review Board approved the study protocol.
Task design and procedure. The localizer task included
two conditions, each presented in 30 s blocks of 10 trials. In the
static display condition, a trial consisted of 1.5 s of a black fixation
cross on a grey background replaced for 1.5 s by the presentation
at fixation of a 3u63u black square containing 100 randomly
scattered white pixels (dots). Participants were instructed to simply
attend to the display. In the motion coherence condition, the trial
was identical except that the static display was substituted by a
dynamic display in which 60% of the 100 dots moved in a
coherent direction, either leftward or rightward, with the
remaining 40% of dots moving in random directions. Dots that
exited the frame were replaced by dots on the opposite side. The
dots moved at a rate of 1.12u/s. Participants were instructed to
respond quickly and accurately about the direction of coherent
motion by pressing one of two buttons with the left and right index
fingers. There were six 30 s blocks of each of the two conditions
per fMRI run, and one run of the localizer task per fMRI session.
The localizer and slow event-related tasks (see below) were
programmed in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with the
Psychophysics Toolbox extension [91,92], and were presented
using an iMAC. The visual display was presented on an LCD
panel and back-projected onto a screen positioned at the front of
the scanner. Subjects lay supine in the scanner and viewed the
display on a mirror positioned above them. Responses were
acquired with two MRI compatible button boxes (Rowland
Institute of Science, Cambridge, MA), one for each index finger.
fMRI data acquisition and analysis. Imaging data was
acquired with a 3 Tesla Philips Intera Achieva scanner at the
Vanderbilt University Institute of Imaging Science. T1 2D and 3D
anatomical images were acquired using standard parameters. T2*
image parameters were: 1.5 s TR, 35 ms TE, 70u flip angle, with a
field of view of 24 cm
2 and 1286128 matrix size, and 25 five-mm
thick slices (1.875 mm
2 in-plane) with no gap. Brainvoyager QX
(v1.4; Brain Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands) was used to
preprocess the data and generate statistical parameter maps. The
fMRI data was motion corrected, slice scan time corrected,
corrected for linear drift, spatially smoothed at 4 mm, and scaled
to the Talairach standard [93]. SPMs were generated using a
random-effects multiple regression analysis. The predictors were
obtained from a box-car design (i.e., a value of 1 for the motion
display and 0 for the static display) convolved with a canonical
gamma model of the hemodynamic response [94].
Activity in the dynamic display condition was contrasted with
that in the static display condition, with the threshold for
controlling for false positives among activated voxels set at the
false discovery rate (FDR) of q(FDR),.05 [95]. ROIs were defined
from the resulting activation foci (maximum ROI volume was set
at 16 mm
3). We evaluated the sensitivity of the group-defined ROI
approach by comparing the group-defined MT
+ ROI to an MT
+
ROI defined as the most activated voxel in each individual subject.
The HRF dynamics of the group average were similar in the
group-defined and individually-defined ROI. Left and right mesial
ROIs (SMA, pre-SMA) were averaged together to improve SNR.
In order to functionally isolate the primary motor cortex (M1)
from surrounding motor cortex, this ROI was defined with the
slow-event related task (see below) instead of the localizer task.
Because the primary motor cortex responds more to contralateral
than to ipsilateral responses [96], M1 could be isolated by
contrasting activity between left and right manual responses in the
event-related experiment. This contrast yielded activation patterns
in left and right precentral gyrus. The M1 ROI was further
anatomically restricted by selecting the subset of activated voxels
whose locations matched those previously associated with
M1[96,97]. Importantly, this functional definition of M1 does
not bias the main speed vs accuracy analysis, as both speed and
accuracy trials were collapsed for the purpose of isolating M1. The
results presented in Figure 6 are for right M1 to both ipsi- and
contra-lateral manual responses, but comparable results were also
obtained when analysis was confined to contra-lateral response
trials or to the left M1.
Slow Event-Related Task
Subjects. Thirteen volunteers (age range 20–31, 4 females)
participated in this study for pay. Eleven of the 13 volunteers
performed the Localizer task.
Task design & procedure. The stimulus display was
identical to the motion display in the Localizer task, except that
a thin (.06u) red or green frame surrounded the 3u63u square. A
trial began when the frame turned from red to green. Participants
were instructed to press a left button with their left index finger
when they detected leftward motion or the right button with their
right index finger when they detect rightward motion. The frame
turned from green to red as soon as subjects made a left or right
response, or 19.5 s after trial onset if subjects did not make a
response during the trial. If motion coherence was not detected,
subjects were instructed to withhold responding. However, to
equate motor response demands across all trials, subjects were also
required to ‘guess’ a response when the frame turned red at the
end of trials for which they failed to detect motion coherence. The
reaction times of these guesses were not included in any analysis.
For all trials, the red frame contained only random motion and
stayed on for 13.5 s before it turned to green again, announcing
the onset of the next trial.
Trials were presented in blocks (7 trials/block), with the two
block types (speed or accuracy) alternating within a run. At block
onsets, subjects were visually instructed to emphasize either the
speed or accuracy of their responses by showing a display with the
letters ‘SPD’ or ‘ACC’ for 3 s, followed by 3 s of fixation and by
6 s of red-framed random motion before the onset of the first trial.
In the speed condition, participants were instructed to ‘‘respond as
quickly as possible as soon as you know the answer’’. Subjects were
given visual feedback at the end of each fMRI run instructing
them to respond more quickly in the next speed blocks if their
mean RT (for all speed blocks within the run) was greater than 9 s
or if their mean RT was less than 2 seconds faster than their mean
RT for accuracy blocks. Participants were not explicitly made
aware of the 9 s deadline. For the accuracy condition, subjects
were instructed to ‘‘Take as much time as needed to make the
correct response. Make as few mistakes as possible.’’ Subjects were
given feedback instructing them to be more accurate, at the end of
the run, if they made one or more mistakes regarding the direction
of coherent motion. Participants were informed that the feedback
was not based on performance in trials without motion coherence
(baseline trials, see below). Three blocks of trials (alternating
between the SPD-ACC-SPD and SPD-ACC-SPD orders across
runs to counterbalance any potential influence in linear drift) were
presented per fMRI run, and subjects performed 4 to 5 of such
runs in an fMRI session.
The experiment included three trial types per speed-accuracy
condition. In the coherence trials (3/7 of all trials), a subset of the
dots started moving coherently to the left or right, with the
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The onset of motion coherence began either 0 s, 4.5 s, or 9 s after
trial onset. The baseline trials (2/7 of all trials) contained only
random motion throughout the trial. The third type of trial (2/7 of
all trials) included motion coherence that always began at trial onset
and increased at a rate of 2%/second. The sole purpose of the latter
trials was to encourage subjects to monitor for motion coherence
soon after trial onset. These trials were infrequent, and were
therefore not analyzed in the present study. Random intermixing of
the three trial types ensured that subjects could not predict if, and
when, motion coherence increased. In addition, subjects were told
that a trial may or may not contain motion coherence, and that in
those that contained motion coherence, this coherence level could
begin to increase at any time during the trial. After being given task
instructions, participants were presented with one block of practice
trials each for the speed and accuracy conditions inthe scanner prior
to the functional scans.
fMRI parameters and analysis. The slow-event fMRI data
was acquired and pre-processed as described in the localizer
experiment with the exception that the data were not spatially or
temporallysmoothed.ROIsdefinedinthelocalizertaskwereprobed
in the slow event-related experiment using custom software
programmed in Matlab (The Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA). Time
series were extracted from each subject’s ROIs and assessed for the
presence of spikes (i.e., changes in raw MR activity that exceed the
mean of the run by 4 or more SD units). Spikes were replaced with
the average value of the immediate neighboring values. Percent
signal change was calculated using the volume acquired at trial onset
asbaseline.Trialswithpeakactivationgreaterthan3SDsawayfrom
the mean, or with reaction times less than 200 ms were discarded.
These ap r i o r icriteria removed at most 19% of all trials per ROI.
The hemodynamic time courses of the coherence trials were
either stimulus- or response-locked. Stimulus locking was per-
formed by aligning and normalizing time courses to the volume
corresponding to the onset of motion coherence at either 0 s, 4.5 s,
or 9 s. The resulting time courses were then averaged across
subjects (random effects analysis). Time courses were also
response-locked by aligning all coherence trials to the volume at
which the response was made, and normalized to the volume
containing the onset of motion coherence. To assess activity build-
up prior to the response, we averaged the percent signal change for
the volume acquired at response time and the volume immediately
preceding it. Subsequent volumes were not analyzed to avoid
contamination from activity associated with post-decision process-
es, such as motor response. Pre-response build-up of activity was
then measured by comparing percent signal change for these
averaged volumes to the normalized coherence onset. We also
carried out paired t-tests between the averaged pre-response and
response volumes of the speed and accuracy conditions to
determine whether there was differential build-up of activity in
the two instruction sets. According to computational models of the
SAT [31–34], brain regions involved in the SAT should not only
demonstrate accumulation of evidence in both speed and accuracy
conditions, but also differential accumulation of evidence under
both these conditions. Therefore, to be considered candidate
neural substrates for the SAT in decision-making, ROIs had to 1)
demonstrate activity increase relative to baseline in both speed and
accuracy conditions, and 2) exhibit a differential activity increase
between these two conditions.
Baseline trials were time-locked and normalized to trial onset.
Differences in baseline activity between speed and accuracy
conditions were statistically assessed during the time of maximal
speed-accuracy difference, corresponding to the average of
volumes between 3 s and 19.5 s. We also assessed whether the
activity difference between the speed and accuracy conditions in
the baseline trials is offset by the difference in the coherence trials
by adding up the mean baseline activity to the coherence time
courses. Specifically, baseline+coherence time courses were
computed by identifying in each subject the mean activation at
4.5 s and 9 s of the stimulus-locked baseline trials. These values
were then added to the values of the coherence response-locked
data of each corresponding delay conditions. Lastly, the data
across all delay conditions (0 s, 4.5 s, and 9 s) were collated for
each subject and averaged across subjects.
Behavioral data analysis. Subjects made one of three
choices in each trial. They decided that either motion coherence
was to the right, to the left, or that there was no motion coherence.
Our manipulation of speed-accuracy instructions was expected to
primarily affect the detection of motion coherence rather than the
discrimination of motion direction (i.e., left vs. right). The bias
introduced by asking subjects to respond sooner in the speed
condition should result in them basing their detection/
discrimination decision on lower motion coherence levels, but it
should not introduce bias in a choice for the direction of motion
coherence. Consistent with this notion, emphasizing response
speed increased the probability of responding (falsely) to random
motion fluctuations (p,.05), but did not bias motion
discrimination (p=0.9). Accordingly, the most appropriate
behavioral assessment of the effect of speed-accuracy instructions
in our experiment is to examine speed-accuracy differences in
performance across conditions that differ in the presence or absence
of motion coherence. For this reason, d’ was used to measure
sensitivity to detect motion coherence and c was used to measure the
decision criterion [98]. The use of the signal detection theory (SDT)
criterion metric c in the present context is further justified by the
finding that sequential sampling models of SDT can account for
speed accuracy trade-offs [54]. To assess whether these different
measures of performance can be tied to specific neural processes, we
correlated for the coherence trials the accuracy-speed differences in
d’ and c with the accuracy-speed differences in brain activity
(importantly, d’ and c were uncorrelated with one another,
r=20.09, p=0.78). Only the data for c are presented in the
Results section, as the d’ measure failed to positively correlate with
anybrainactivity,consistentwithapriorstudy[99].Suchnullresults
may be accounted for by the hypothesis that one only needs small
changes in neural activity that may be imperceptible to fMRI to
produce substantial shifts in d’ [17].
Although signal detection measures of performance were
primarily used for the analysis of motion detection, an SAT was
also evident when accuracy performance in motion discrimination
was measured (M=99.0% for accuracy, M=95.1% for speed,
t(12)=2.19, p,0.05). Performance in motion discrimination was
maintained at a high level in order to ensure that a sufficient
number of correct trials were available for fMRI data analysis. It
has been shown that the coupling between speed and accuracy still
holds even at high accuracy levels [40].
Supporting Information
Table S1 Activation t-values from the Coherence Trial Analysis.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.s001 (0.10 MB
DOC)
Table S2 Activation t-values from the Baseline Trial Analysis.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.s002 (0.10 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 Hemodynamic time courses for hits (motion coher-
ence trials with a correct response in red) and false alarms (baseline
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and (B) pre-SMA. One participant made only one false alarm in
the speed condition and was removed from the analysis. All trials
were response-locked (R) and normalized to the onset of the trial.
Only hits and false alarms are shown for the speed condition
because there were too few false alarms in the accuracy condition.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002635.s003 (0.35 MB TIF)
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